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Abstract
We investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose
to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private
firm. Thus, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements, if the degree of
public firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for both public
and private firms that choose Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant strategy
only for the private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is
sufficiently large. Consequently, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, (i) social
welfare under Bertrand competition is determined in equilibrium, if the degree of public
firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently small; and (ii) if the degree of its inefficiency is sufficiently
large, social welfare under which the private firm sets its price and the public firm sets its
quantity is determined in equilibrium. Moreover, the ranking of a private firm’s profit is not
reversed.
JEL: D43, H44, J51, L13.
Keywords: Inefficiency, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
1 Introduction
There are several studies of mixed oligopolies, in which public firms maximize their social welfare,
whereas the private firms compete with public firms in order to maximize their own profits (see
De Fraja and Delbono (1990), De Fraja (2009) and Bo¨s (1991) for general reviews of mixed
oligopolies). Studies of mixed oligopolies have become richer and more diverse over the past
decade (e.g., Matsumura, 1998; Matsumura and Matsushima, 2004; Heywood and Ye, 2008;
Barcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga, 2011), and the occurrence of mixed oligopolies in industry
has also become a common feature across different economic systems. However, relatively few
theoretical analyses of the choice of strategic variables for prices or quantities have emerged in
recent publications on mixed oligopolies.
In the real world, the public and private firms frequently interact many levels. In the
present research, we study these interactions between public and private firms by allowing them
to choose strategically set their own levels of price or quantity competition. Thus, the present
study is modeled on a non-cooperative game in which the choice of strategic variables is set in a
mixed duopoly. Several authors have analyzed the strategic variables in non-cooperative games.
For a purely private duopoly, Singh and Vives (1984) were the first to show that Bertrand
competition is more efficient than Cournot competition when goods are differentiated (see also
Cheng, 1985; Okuguchi, 1987). They found that Cournot equilibrium profits are greater than
Bertrand equilibrium profits when goods are substitutes and vice versa when goods are comple-
ments. Moreover, they established that when private firms play the downstream duopoly game,
their dominant strategy in a purely private duopoly is to choose quantity contracts if goods
are substitutes, but to select prices if they are complements1. These studies of the choice of
†Graduate School of International Studies, Pusan National University, Busandaehak-ro 63 beon-gil,
Geumjeong-gu, Pusan 609-735, Republic of Korea, Tel:+82-51-510-2532, Fax:+82-51-581-7144, E-mail:
choipnu@pusan.ac.kr
1Dastidar (1997), Qiu (1997), Lambertini (1997), Ha¨ckner (2000), Zanchettin (2006), and Amir and Jin (2001),
among others, have analyzed counterexamples based on the framework of Singh and Vives (1984) by allowing for
a wider range of cost and demand asymmetries.
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strategic variables for prices or quantities, have thus suggested important implications for the
determination of market outcomes.
However, one issue that remains to be analyzed is whether the above results are robust to
changes in the type of industry competition. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no previous
studies have considered the case of both private and public firms choosing to set quantities
or prices in a mixed duopoly when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. The
present study aims to fill this gap in the literature. In this study, we investigate whether the
standard results of the ranking of Cournot competition and Bertrand competition outcomes
under a differentiated mixed duopoly hold. More specifically, we illustrate how the choice of
strategic variables for setting quantities or prices affects social welfare in a mixed duopoly.
To the author’s knowledge, only two previous studies have compared Bertrand and Cournot
outcomes in a mixed oligopoly: Ghosh and Mitra (2010) and Choi (2009). Given that the goods
are substitutes, Ghosh and Mitra (2010) compared Cournot with Bertrand competition in a
mixed oligopoly where the rankings of profit and social welfare are determined without public
and private firms choosing strategic variables. Moreover, in a companion paper, considering the
nature of goods, Choi (2009) introduced a case in which both private and public firms choose
to set prices or quantities when trade unions are included in the mixed duopoly. These studies
assumed that the public firm is equally efficient as a private firm. However, the present study
crucially differs from Choi (2009) and Ghosh and Mitra (2010) as our focus is primarily on
industry competition when private firms are more efficient than the public firm in the absence
of trade unions2.
Using a canonical two-stage game model, we demonstrate that regardless of whether the
goods are substitutes or complements, if the degree of public firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently
small, for both the public and private firms, choosing Cournot competition is strictly dominated
by choosing Bertrand competition. However, for the private firm, choosing Cournot competi-
tion is strictly dominated by choosing Bertrand competition if the degree of the public firm’s
inefficiency is sufficiently large. Given this, choosing Bertrand (respectively, quantity-price (i.e.,
when the public firm sets the quantity and the private firm sets the price, which herein is termed
quantity-price)) competition is the best public firm can do if the degree of inefficiency of the
public firm is sufficiently small (respectively, large). This is because total output under Bertrand
competition is higher than it is under quantity-price competition if the inefficiency level of the
public firm is sufficiently small, and vice versa. In other words, the private firm will always
opt for Bertrand competition, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements
in the first stage (i.e., a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)). By contrast, Choi
(2009) found that a public firm always chooses Bertrand competition and a private firm chooses
either a Bertrand or a Cournot type of contract regardless of whether the goods are substitutes
or complements (i.e., multiple SPNEs). However, we show that if the degree of public firm’s
inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for both the public and private
firms that chooses Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant strategy only for the
private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is sufficiently large
when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. This finding contradicts that of Choi
(2009), who claimed that public and private firms are equally efficient in the presence of trade
unions. This is because once the public firm’s decision variable is set with the dominant strategy
of Bertrand competition, the choice of the private firm no longer matters.
Consequently, the main finding in the present study differs from Singh and Vives’s (1984)
conclusion in which the dominant strategy for private firms in a purely private duopoly is to
2From the empirical studies, it is found that the public firm tends to be less efficient than the private firm.
See e.g., Megginson and Netter (2001), La Porta and Lopez-de-Silane (1999), Warzynski (2003), and Nishiyama
and Smetter (2007).
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choose the quantity contract if goods are substitutes and vice versa3. Because we endogenously
investigate the type of contract in a mixed duopoly, this study differs from the current body of
knowledge on this topic in two important aspects. First, previous studies of mixed oligopolies
have considered an exogenous type of contract rather than an endogenous one when the public
firm is less efficient than the private firm. Second, while previous studies have focused on
the opposite results with regard to the Cournot-Bertrand profit differential in a purely private
duopoly market, this study not only investigates the case when both private and public firms
choose to set prices or quantities, but also determines how social welfare is affected by the type
of contract structure.
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we describe the
model. Section 3 presents fixed motives on the type of contract. Section 4 determines firms’
endogenous choices of strategic variables. Concluding remarks appear in Section 5.
2 The Model
The basic structure is a differentiated duopoly model, which is a simplified version of Singh and
Vives’s (1984) model. Consider two single-product firms that produce differentiated products
that are supplied by a public firm (firm 0) and a private firm (firm 1). We assume that the
representative consumer’s utility is a quadratic function given by
U = xi + xj − 1
2
(
x2i + 2cxixj + x
2
i
)
, i 6= j; i, j = 0, 1,
where xi denotes the output of firm i (i = 0, 1). The parameter c ∈ (0, 1) is a measure of
the degree of substitutability among goods, while a negative c ∈ (−1, 0) implies that goods are
complements. In the main body of analysis, we focus on the imperfect substitutability case of
c ∈ (0, 1). However, we will mention later the imperfect complementarity case of c ∈ (−1, 0) since
it is easy to calculate when goods are complements4. Thus, the inverse demand is characterized
by
pi = 1− cxj − xi, (1)
where pi is firm i’s market price and xi denotes the output of firm i (i = 0, 1). Hence, we can
obtain the direct demands as
xi =
1− c+ cpj − pi
1− c2 (2)
provided the quantities are positive.
The private firm has constant marginal cost of production, which is normalized to zero. The
public firm also has constant marginal cost of production, however, it is assumed to be less
efficient than the private firm. Let θ > 0 be the inefficiency of the public firm. For simplicity,
following Pal (1998), we assume that the profit of private firm 1 and the profit of the public firm
0 as follows:
pi1 = p1x1 and pi0 = (p0 − θ)x0,
3Lo´pez (2007) and Lo´pez and Naylor (2004) introduced the union utilities of private firms into a model of the
choice of strategic variables for setting prices or quantities. They showed that Singh and Vives’s (1984) result
holds unless unions are powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility functions.
4We exclude independent case since the choice of strategic variables for setting prices or quantities does not
change social welfare in a mixed duopoly.
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respectively5. As is customarily assumed in a mixed oligopoly, the public firm’s objective, SW ,
is to maximize welfare, which is defined as the sum of the consumer surplus and the profits of
individual firms. Thus, the public firm aims to maximize social welfare, which is defined as
SW = U −
1∑
i=0
pixi +
1∑
i=0
pii,
where U −∑1i=0 pixi is the consumer surplus, and pii is the profit of both the private and public
firms.
This study considers that each firm can make two types of binding contracts with consumers,
as described by Singh and Vives (1984) and Lo´pez (2007). Thus, a two-stage game is conducted.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the private and public firms simultane-
ously commit to choosing strategic variable, i.e., either price or quantity (which determines the
type of contract), to set in the mixed duopoly. In the second stage, each firm chooses its quantity
or price simultaneously, in order to maximize its objective knowledge of the strategic variable
of the public and private firms. As in Singh and Vives (1984), we adopt the same assumption.
i.e., that there are prohibitively high costs associated with changing the type of contract in the
first stage.
3 Market Equilibrium under a Mixed Duopoly
3.1 Results: Fixed Contract Motives with Solutions for Substitutes
Before the type of contract is applied to the model to identify the point of equilibrium, we ex-
plain four different cases of contract games. In Bertrand competition, firms set prices, whereas
in Cournot competition, firms set quantities. In mixed cases, either firm 0 sets the price and
firm 1 sets the quantity or, vice versa. Such a game is solved by backward induction (i.e., the
solution concept used is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE)).
3.1.1. [Cournot Competition Game]: Assume that firm i(i = 0, 1) faces the demand
functions given by pi = 1 − cxj − xi. In the second stage, the public firm’s objective is to
maximize the social welfare, which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus, and all firm’s
profit
SW = x0 + x1 − (x
2
0 + x
2
1)
2
− cx1x0 − θx0. (3)
The best reply functions of the public and private firms are given by
∂SW
∂x0
= 1− cx1 − θ − x0 = 0, ∂pi1
∂x1
= 1− cx0 − 2x1 = 0, (4)
respectively. Solving the first-order conditions in Eq. (4), we obtain following Lemma 1.
5One drawback of the present model is that it does not explain the difference in efficiency between the private
and the public firms, however, it assumes the public firm’s inefficiency exogenously. See De Fraja (2009, pp. 5-6)
for discussion of the public firm’s inefficiency.
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Lemma 1: Suppose that the goods are substitutes. Then, the equilibrium values under Cournot
competition, denoted as picc1 , x
cc
i , p
cc
i and SW
cc are given by
xcc0 =
2− c− 2θ
2− c2 , x
cc
1 =
1− c+ cθ
2− c2 , p
cc
0 = θ, p
cc
1 =
1− c+ cθ
2− c2 ,
picc1 =
(1− c+ cθ)2
(2− c2)2 , SW
cc =
7− 6c− 2c2 + 2c3 − θ(8− 6c− 2c2 + 2c3) + θ2(4− c2)
2(2− c2)2 .
3.1.2. [Bertrand Competition Game]; Consider that firm i faces the direct demand as
in Eq. (2). In the second stage, by maximizing social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm
sets its price as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public
firm). The public firm’s and private firm’s objectives are given by
max
p0
SW =
2(1− c2)[1− c+ cp1 − p0 + 1− c+ cp0 − p1 − θ(1− c+ cp1 − p0)]
2(1− c2)2
− (1− c+ cp1 − p0)
2 + (1− c+ cp0 − p1)2 + 2c(1− c+ cp0 − p1)(1− c+ cp1 − p0)
2(1− c2)2 ,
max
p1
pi1 =
p1(1− c+ cp0 − p1)
1− c2 .
Similarly, repeating the same process as in the previous case yields the first-order conditions of
the public and private firms with respect to p0 and p1
∂SW
∂p0
= θ + cp1 − p0 = 0, ∂pi1
∂p1
= 1− c+ cp0 − 2p1 = 0, (5)
respectively. Straightforward computation yields Lemma 2.
Lemma 2: Suppose that the goods are substitutes. Then, the equilibrium values under Bertrand
competition, denoted as pibb1 , x
bb
i , p
bb
i and SW
bb are given by
xbb1 =
1− c+ cθ
(1− c2)(2− c2) , x
bb
0 =
1− c− θ
1− c2 , p
bb
1 =
1− c+ cθ
2− c2 , p
bb
0 =
c(1− c) + 2θ
2− c2 ,
pibb1 =
(1− c+ cθ)2
(1− c2)(2− c2)2 , SW
bb =
7− 6c− 15c2 + 12c3 + 11c4 − 8c5 − 3c6 + 2c7 − θΩ + θ2Ψ
2(1− c2)2(2− c2)2 ,
where Ω = 8− 6c− 18c2 + 16c3 + 14c4 − 8c5 − 4c6 + 2c7 and Ψ = 4− 9c2 + 4c4 − 2c6.
3.1.3. [Firm 0 Sets Price, Firm 1 Sets Quantity (Price-Quantity)]: Let firm 0
optimally choose its price as a best response to any quantity chosen by private firm 1, and let
private firm 1 optimally choose its quantity as a best response to any price chosen by public
firm 0. Each demand function that each firm i faces is given by
x0 = 1− cx1 − p0 and p1 = 1− c+ cp0 − (1− c2)x1,
respectively. In the second stage, by maximizing social welfare (respectively, profit) each firm
sets its price as a best response to any price chosen by its private firm (respectively, the public
firm). The public firm’s objective, as in the previous case, is given as follows:
max
p0
SW = 1− cx1 − p0 + x1 − 1
2
[(1− cx1 − p0)2 + x21]− cx1(1− cx1 − p0)− θ(1− cx1 − p0).
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respectively. Similarly, repeating the same process as in previous cases yields the first-order
conditions of the public and private firms with respect to p0 and x1
∂SW
∂p0
= θ − p0 = 0, ∂pi1
∂x1
= 1− c+ cp0 − 2(1− c2)x1 = 0. (6)
Substituting the pair (x1, p0) into the pair (x0, p1) yields Lemma 3.
Lemma 3: Suppose that the goods are are substitutes. Then, the equilibrium values under the
price-quantity, denoted as pibc1 , p
bc
i , x
bc
i , and SW
bc are given by
xbc1 =
1− c+ cθ
2(1− c2) , x
bc
0 =
2− c− c2 − θ(2− c2)
2(1− c2) , p
bc
1 =
1− c+ cθ
2
, pbc0 = θ,
pibc1 =
(1− c+ cθ)2
4(1− c2) , SW
bc =
7− 6c− 8c2 + 6c3 + c4 − θ(8− 6c− 10c2 + 6c3 + 2c4) + θ2(4− 5c2 + c4)
8(1− c2)2 .
3.1.4. [Firm 0 Sets Quantity, Firm 1 Sets Price (Quantity-Price)]: Let firm 1
optimally choose its price as a best response to any quantity chosen by public firm 0, and let
public firm 0 optimally choose its quantity as a best response to any price chosen by private
firm 1. Each demand function that each firm i faces is given by
x1 = 1− cx0 − p1 and p0 = 1− c+ cp1 − (1− c2)x0,
respectively. Thus, the public firm’s objective is given as in the previous case as follows:
max
x0
SW = 1− cx0 − p1 + x0 − [(1− cx0 − p1)
2 + x20 + 2cx0(1− cx0 − p1)]
2
− θx0.
Repeating the same process as in previous cases yields the first-order conditions with respect to
x0 and p1:
∂SW
∂x0
= 1− θ − c− x0 + c2x0 = 0, ∂pi1
∂p1
= 1− cx0 − 2p1 = 0. (7)
Similarly, substituting the pair (x0, p1) into the pair (x1, p0) yields Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: Suppose that the goods are substitutes. Then, the equilibrium values under the
quantity-price competition, denoted as picb1 , p
cb
i , x
cb
i , and SW
cb are given by
pcb1 =
1− c+ cθ
2(1− c2) , x
cb
0 =
1− c− θ
1− c2 , p
cb
0 =
c− c2 + 2θ
2(1− c2) , x
cb
1 =
1− c+ cθ
2(1− c2) ,
picb1 =
(1− c+ cθ)2
4(1− c2)2 , SW
cb =
7− 6c− 9c2 + 8c3 − θ(8− 6c− 10c2 + 8c3) + θ2(4− 5c2)
8(1− c2)2 .
4 The Choice of Contract under a Mixed Duopoly
Once the equilibria for the four fixed types of contract and social-welfare levels have been derived
as discussed in the preceding section, the type of contract can be determined endogenously by
calculating each social-welfare level and private firm’s profit. Therefore, we consider the cases
of substitutes and complements at the same time.
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To employ the two-stage game, let “C” and “B” represent, respectively, Cournot and Bertrand
competition with regard to each firm’s choice. In this section, the SPNE will be found in the
first stage for any given pair of competition types. Recall that we consider positive values of
c are associated with substitutes and negative values with complements in the mixed market.
Thus, the payoff matrix for the contract game can be represented as shown Table 1.
Table 1: Contract Game
Firm 1
Firm 0
C B
C SW cc, picc1 SW
cb, picb1
B SW bc, pibc1 SW
bb, pibb1
Comparing picc1 with pi
cb
1 , and pi
bc
1 with pi
bb
1 , we find that, regardless of the nature of goods,
picc1 − picb1 = 3c2 < 4, pibc1 − pibb1 = c2 < 4, (8)
respectively. This is because regardless of what type the public firm chooses under either sub-
stitutes or complements, the output and price are higher when the private firm chooses to play
Bertrand competition than when it chooses to play Cournot competition.
On the other hand, comparing SW bb with SW cb, we find
SW bb − SW cb = 4c2 − 8c3 + c4 + 6c5 − 3c6 − θ(8c3 + 8c4 + 6c5 − 6c6)− θ2(8c4 + 3c6), (9)
when the goods are substitutes with c ∈ (0, 1), and when the goods are complements with
c ∈ (−1, 0). By directly applying Eq. (9) to a discriminant, we have the roots, θ for c ∈ (−1, 0)
and c ∈ (1, 0) because it is a second-order polynomial of θ and the maximum value is attained
from (8c4 + 3c6) > 0 regardless of the nature of goods. Thus, Table 2 provides two roots, one
positive and the other negative.
Table 2: Roots for θ with c
SW bb − SW cb if c ∈ (0, 1) SW bb − SW cb if c ∈ (−1, 0)
c θ1 θ
s θ2 θ
c
0.1 -13.90593506 2.879783131 -4.436244115 13.48481199
0.3 -4.850474896 0.506258854 -1.905216584 4.44532138
0.5 -3.036602853 0.122317138 -1.24863589 2.677207319
0.7 -2.206878309 0.022235074 -0.815701244 1.931706674
0.9 -1.672145773 0.001111364 -0.443555297 1.512480406
0.99 -1.47530519 6.69887E-06 -0.285066 1.372916249
As a result, regardless of the nature of goods, if there can exist a critical value of θk > θ, k = c, s
such that for all θ > 0, we find the difference as SW bb > SW cb, and vice versa.
Moreover, comparing SW cc with SW bc yields
SW cc − SW bc =− 4c2 + 8c3 + c4 − 10c5 + 4c6 + 2c7 − c8
− θ(8c3 − 8c4 − 10c5 + 10c6 + 2c7 − 2c8)− θ2(4c4 − 5c6 + c8), (10)
when the goods are substitutes with c ∈ (0, 1), and when the goods are complements with
c ∈ (−1, 0). Similarly, by directly applying Eq. (10) to a discriminant, we have the two same
roots, θ for c ∈ (−1, 0) and c ∈ (1, 0) and the maximum value is attained from (4c4−5c6+c8) > 0
regardless of the nature of goods. Thus, Table 3 provides two roots, two same positive roots
when the goods are complement, and the two same negative roots when the goods are substitutes
as follows:
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Table 3: Roots for θ with c
SW cc − SW bc if c ∈ (0, 1) SW cc − SW bc if c ∈ (−1, 0)
c θ3 θ4 θ5 θ6
0.1 -9 -9 11 11
0.3 -2.333333333 -2.333333333 4.333333333 4.333333333
0.5 -1 -1 3 3
0.7 -0.428571429 -0.428571429 2.428571429 2.428571429
0.9 -0.111111111 -0.111111111 2.111111111 2.111111111
0.99 -0.01010101 -0.01010101 2.010100835 2.010100835
Hence, regardless of the nature of goods, we always obtain that SW cc < SW bc since same one
real root exists when comparing SW cc with SW bc. Having derived the comparison each social
welfare for each critical value of θ, we can find the Nash equilibrium in the contract stage for
any given set of private firm’s profit and the level of social welfare in the mixed duopoly.
Clearly, there can be sustained a unique SPNE in the contract stage depending on the degree
of the inefficiency of the public firm: (B, B) or (C, B). Hence, choosing Bertrand (respectively,
quantity-price) competition is the best for public and private firms if θ < θk (respectively,
θ > θk). As in Table 1, for the private firm, choosing Cournot competition is strictly dominated
by choosing Bertrand competition, so the private firm never chooses Cournot competition. A
unique SPNE of the two-stage game in a mixed duopoly is found and this can be stated in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1: Regardless of the nature of goods, the private firm always chooses a Bertrand
type of contract and the public firm chooses either a Bertrand or a Cournot type of contract
depending on the value of θ in the first stage.
By restricting attention to the SPNE of the two-stage game, one significant result can be derived
from Proposition 1: Both public and private firms choose a type of contract that does not depend
on the value of c in the equilibrium. Sustaining of a unique SPNE from both the private firm’s
dominant strategy and the degree of public firm’s inefficiency thus plays an important role in
the derivation of the result, as explained below.
Given the private firm’s strategy (i.e., profit maximization), and once its decision variable has
been set, the choice of the public firm only depends on its degree of inefficiency. In other words,
although the public firm under quantity-price competition sets a higher price than it would under
Bertrand competition (i.e., pcb0 > p
bb
0 and x
cb
0 = x
bb
0 ), total output is higher under quantity-price
competition than it would be under Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency of the
public firm is sufficiently large, and vice versa (i.e., Xcb ≡ xcb1 + xcb0 R Xbb ≡ xbb1 + xbb0 ⇔ θ R
(12 + c− 5c2)/(4− c2)). This effect means that each level of social welfare is comparable6.
In our framework of a mixed duopoly, if the degree of the public firm’s inefficiency is suf-
ficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for both public and private firms that choose
Bertrand competition, regardless of the nature of goods. However, if the degree of the public
6In reality, the services provided by public sectors are generally charged at lower prices than those provided by
private counterparts. For example, in vertically differentiated mixed markets, a public firm typically sets its price
lower with a lower quality than the private counterparts since it is concerned about social welfare even though
the public firm is unprofitable under Bertrand competition. According to Ishibashi and Matsushima (2008) and
Glazer and Niskanen (1997), governmental facilities are often small, of poor quality, and overcrowded, and many
services provided by public sectors are also provided privately (e.g., public versus private schools and universities;
public versus private medical care; public parks versus private golf courses). The reason for the existence of public
firms is that they are socially desirable, even though they are unprofitable under either Bertrand or quantity-
price competition. Theoretical results of present paper can claim considerable reliability, however, the result of
empirical researches needs to be understood restrictively in the light of our theoretical results.
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firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently large, there is no dominant strategy for the public firm. By
contrast, in the study by Singh and Vives (1984) under a purely private duopoly, a dominant
strategy exists for both firms that choose Cournot (or Bertrand) competition if the goods are
substitutes (or complements). Contrary to finding of Singh and Vives (1984), we show that
social welfare is higher under Bertrand than it is under quantity-price competition if the degree
of inefficiency is sufficiently small, and vice versa.
Ghosh and Mitra (2010) compared Cournot and Bertrand competition in a mixed oligopoly
without an endogenous type of contract when the public firm is equally efficient as a private
firm. They demonstrated that despite the ambiguity in price ordering between Bertrand and
Cournot competition for private firms, a comparison of quantities and profits yields unambiguous
results. In other words, the public firm’s output is higher under Cournot competition, whereas
the private firm’s output is lower in the same circumstances. In addition, the profits of both
firms are lower under Cournot competition than they are under Bertrand competition. It should
be noted that Ghosh and Mitra (2010) focused on the case of substitutes, however. The present
stdudy shows that the total output and social welfare under either Bertrand competition or
quantity-price competition can be higher depending on the degree of inefficiency of the public
firm; because choosing a Bertrand type of contract for private firm is preferable irrespective of
the nature of goods. Moreover, when the public firm is less efficient than the private firms, the
present study differs from previous studies of (unionized) mixed oligopolies, in which the private
and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities.
With the equilibrium levels, we are ready to assess the impacts on social welfare. By compar-
ing the profits obtained under either Bertrand or quantity-price equilibrium in a mixed duopoly,
the following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 2: In the equilibrium, regardless of the nature of goods, the private firm’s profit
under quantity-price competition is always higher than that under Bertrand competition.
Proposition 2 states that the comparison of a private firm’s profit holds irrespective of the nature
of goods. This is because regardless of the nature of goods, output and price are smaller under a
Bertrand contract than under either a price or a quantity contract (i.e., pcb1 > p
bb
1 and x
cb
1 > x
bb
1 ).
In this case, the ranking of a private firm’s profit is not reversed (i.e., picb1 > pi
bb
1 ), which contrasts
with the findings of Singh and Vives (1984).
Next, when the public firm is equally efficient as the private firm, we can easily obtain
SW bc > SW cc and SW bb > SW cb regardless of the nature of goods7. The following corollary
can thus be stated:
Corollary 1: Suppose the public firm is equally efficient as the private firm. In equilibrium,
regardless of the nature of goods, there can be sustained a SPNE in the contract stage of the
game: (B,B).
Corollary 1 suggests that regardless of nature of goods, choosing the Bertrand contract is the
best for each firm i, when the competitor’s choice of contract is either the price or the quantity
contract. This is because there exists a dominant strategy for both public and private firms that
choose Bertrand competition, and Xbb > Xcb and Xbc ≡ xbc1 + xbc0 > Xcc ≡ xcc1 + xcc0 for the
public firm when θ = 0. Thus, in our framework of a mixed duopoly, there can be sustained a
unique SPNE of Bertrand competition in the contract stage of the game when the public firm
is equally efficient as the private firm. Corollary 1 differs from Choi (2009), which there can
7From Eqs. (9) and (10), we obtain that regardless of the nature of goods, SW cc < SW bc ⇔ −4c2 + 8c3 +
c4 − 10c5 + 4c6 + 2c7 − c8 < 0 and SW bb > SW cb ⇔ 4c2 − 8c3 + c4 + 6c5 − 3c6 > 0 when θ = 0.
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be sustained multiple SPNEs (i.e., (C,B) and (B,B) as in the present paper) in contract stage
under unionized mixed duopoly if the public firm is equally efficient as the private firm.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the present study, we investigated a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public
firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than
the private firm. A choice of strategic variables was proposed endogenously in the first stage.
For the case of a mixed duopoly, regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements, if
the degree of public firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for
both public and private firms that choose Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant
strategy only for the private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is
sufficiently large. This effect leads the private firm to use the strategic commitment of Bertrand
competition if the degree of the public firm’s inefficiency is sufficiently large. Moreover, there
can be sustained a unique SPNE in the contract stage of the game depending on the degree of
public firm’s inefficiency. This result contrasts with the findings of Singh and Vives (1984), who
found that the dominant strategy for each private firm in a purely private duopoly is to choose
either a quantity or a price contract. Hence, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of
goods; furthermore, the ranking of the private firm’s profit is not reversed.
We conclude by discussing the limitations of the present study. For example, it may be
important to extend Singh and Vives’s (1984) framework by assuming no ex-ante commitment
over the type of contract that each firm offers to consumers. We have not extended the model
to consider a situation in which there exists a wider range of cost and demand asymmetries,
which have already been investigated by previous studies of a purely private duopoly. Moreover,
we did not extend our results by considering nonlinear demand structures. An extension of our
model in these directions would offer an avenue for future research.
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